ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

Asymmetric warfare constitutes of two opponents that abide by a completely different set of military principles, views, tactics, and resources.

Fundamentally, this results in weaknesses and strengths that each party can target and exploit. Militarized and non-militarized strategies are part of the asymmetric warfare process. Asymmetric warfare does not engage in traditional force-on-force engagements but is a type of hit-and-run guerilla attack wherein the vulnerabilities of the security apparatus are targeted. Asymmetric warfare brings into play TTPs that are often unanticipated by the security forces. The insurgents mode of attack banks on the concept of tactical surprise, catching the security forces off-balanced and unprepared.

They use their limited military capabilities and the physical environment in the most optimum fashion so as to negate the security forces advantage and spring a surprise with the intent to deliver a tactical defeat and then disappear to their sanctuary in the physical environment. Insurgency is a type of asymmetric warfare. Firstly, asymmetrical warfare is not a new form of warfare. There have been other terms used to describe this type of warfare. Conflicts such as guerrilla warfare, people’s war, and low intensity warfare have traditionally described wars in which asymmetrical tactics have been used effectively against hostile forces.

Asymmetric warfare tactics are available to all forces in a war - good and bad, conventional and non-conventional. These tactics are known to be used by irregular military forces such as freedom fighters, mercenaries, military special forces operators and intelligence operators. However, for the scope of this paper, asymmetrical warfare will be used to describe violent elements such as organized criminal gangs, insurgents and terrorists. These elements usually are incapable to directly engage the forces of established authority and instead use asymmetrical warfare for leverage.

There are features about asymmetrical warfare that are divergent from conventional warfare when observed from a counter-insurgency point of view. These are: the practice of insurgents to hide among the general population; the insurgents’ use of unconventional improvised weapons and the use of civilians as targets for violent attacks. In an asymmetrical warfare there are no clear battle lines and insurgents do take advantage by even seeking to spread their subversion from within the society or nation. The advantage of the use of technology in a conventional warfare is neutralized by the combat environment in an asymmetrical warfare. Insurgents have their strategic goals and agenda that they pursue in asymmetrical warfare.

These goals may be to increase recruits and train new members, removing opponents to their belief, boosting their morale, their image and legitimacy and to spread fear. They use tactics such as assassinations, bombings, hijacking and hostage taking. The targets of their attacks are usually public and vulnerable areas and places, such as bridges and tunnels, critical infrastructure, high profile corporations, nuclear reactors, oil plants, churches and water facilities among others.

“Insurgency”, a word often confused as well as used with a near synonym “insurgency”. Although not very clear there exists a thin line of difference between the two. Often we see that the basic goals of both insurgents and insurgents are similar; yet if we examine insurgency and insurgency, specific differences emerge. The main base difference is that insurgency is a movement- an effort with a very specific aim and course of action.

Another difference is the intent of the component activities and operations of insurgencies versus insurgency. Although there are places where insurgency, guerilla warfare, and criminal behavior all overlap, groups that are exclusively insurgent, or subordinate "wings" of insurgencies formed to specifically employ terror tactics, demonstrate clear differences in their objectives and operations. The ultimate goal of an insurgency is to politically amputate the working power for control of all or a portion of a desired territory, or force political concessions in sharing political power. Insurgencies greatly require the active or tacit support of some portion of the population involved.

External support, recognition or approval from other countries or political entities can be useful to insurgents, but is not generally aimed at. Whereas, a terror group does not require and rarely has the active support or even the sympathy of a large fraction of the population. While insurgents will frequently describe themselves as "insurgents" or "guerillas", insurgents will not refer to themselves as "insurgents" but describe them using military or political terminology as “freedom fighters”, “soldiers” or “activists”. What can we guess the reason behind such risky moves? Obviously, there has to be a trigger factor for choosing such a path.

If we look behind in world history, the most radical portions of the population are mostly engaged in such activities. Why so? Why would they leave the homely security and live lives of most wanted nomads? Yes, the answer lays in the brute fact that they have been denied justice time and again. They were made to bear injustice that cannot be, has not been or will not be addressed by the so called governing power of varied countries. This very situation has mostly led the minority to take up arms in order to make the supreme power hear their pleas. But as times changed, the way and acuteness of their action changed.

Starting from bow and arrow today they have successfully managed to outset violence with armed resistance. The core belief that led to these movements is that their cause is righteous (whether or not). In this era the belief has made such a strong foundation that based upon it they fuel the passions of general public. This sorry state could have been well avoided if the reason would be uprooted at the initial stage.

Only if the existing situations would be resolved one could argue that no word called insurgency would ever exist. But sadly this was not done and the seeds have now sprouted to produce one of the greatest threats to not only general public, the government, a nation but the world peace at large.

Now if we examine the passion leading to insurgent movements in a deeper ground, we shall see that unlike conventional warfronts, they have the freedom of action. It becomes nearly impossible to predict their upcoming actions. They can make their own plan of action, at their own chosen times and places disregarding the conventional formulae. The upper hand they get is because of their geographic shelling and also some political organizations aiding them for transferring power from central to local control. Further, they need not wait for permissions to be granted, rules to be passed, conventions to be maintained and other restrictions of statehood which may inhibit their adversary. Most importantly, their targets are specific, plan of action with unmatched convention and they have near-perfect intelligence which helps them to successfully prove their vulnerability.

Thus it is very well understood that the insurgency problems are not the branches of the terror tree that can be cleaned up by using brute force but it lies at the grass root level. Then what should be the way of approach to search and hit them? The answer lies in the question itself- i.e. handling the problem right from the base. Here comes into action the sensitive part of approach- counterinsurgency campaigns. These campaigns must be conducted with utmost discipline and vigor; and must incorporate all elements of national power into its strategy to have any hope of success. The methods used earlier had very little if not null effect in eradicating the problem. Although military operations are an essential component in counterinsurgency operations previous experiences have proved that political, economic and informational/diplomatic efforts ultimately lead to successful quelling an insurgency.

One indispensable component of counterinsurgency warfare, which cuts across the entire spectrum of operations, is the requirement for actionable intelligence. Keeping in view the grounds of their action, only way to curb their encroachment is possession of a good intelligence, without which there is very little or no hope to defeat them. The successful management of counterinsurgency warfare depends on the well-organized intelligence architecture that is experienced, managed and carried upon and an equal emphasis on counter intelligence , so often ignored. Given this fact, it is paramount that counterinsurgency forces gain this essential intelligence.

Counterinsurgency (COIN) is an intelligence driven endeavor. Intelligence helps in understanding the operational environment. Commanders require accurate intelligence about the insurgents, their organization and their sympathizers in the local populace. the primitive conventions of war, counterintelligence does and does not at large depend on the data derivations from technical means (e.g. signal intelligence-SIGINT, imagery intelligence-IMINT and measurement intelligence- MASINT, respectively); but is dependent on collection of relevant information from human interface.

This intelligence is harvested from the human intelligence (HUMINT), investigations and analytic capabilities of organic military intelligence and police forces in the area of operations. There are four important aspects of COIN that are vital, from an intelligence standpoint, in successfully undertaking a mission. It is imperative to understand the environment in which you operate. As much detail as possible must be gathered about the operational environment, the level and nature of the threats and the planned course of action to manage those threats.

The other aspects are ISR, counterintelligence against insurgency and collaboration between intelligent assets and the host nation and its populace. A proper understanding of the operational environment helps in making the right decision in deploying proper levels of force, managing the interaction with the people and being sensitive towards the culture and its impact. Environment knowledge even includes weather analysis as the weather can be a hindrance and a blessing in operations. Social structure is also a considered part of the environment.

Networks of people and organizations play important roles and have valuable knowledge that could be of assistance. It would be essential to know the roles and statuses of such persons and organizations within the operational environment. The third civil consideration is multi-lingual. There must be the capacity to learn a new language and achieving a high level of fluency in it. This is a simple and critical requirement.

The fourth consideration is discovering who represents the center of power and authority. This would require the engagement of this authority figure by establishing relationships with central and local governments, bureau, and other political organizations.

The fifth step in Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield is evaluating the threat. The limitations, vulnerabilities of the enemy must be known and investigated to gain an advantage in battle. In other words, finding out weaknesses about the insurgency and exploiting them. There are four items that are considered as critical characteristics of the insurgency that must be known: their goals, grievances (of the people) that the insurgency can exploit, means of support, organization of insurgent forces, and accurate locations of key insurgent leaders.

The identification of objectives - political motives, support, political activities, and violent activities are another paramount part of evaluating the insurgency. But focus will be on activities that are considered as violent activities because they have the most directive relationship to asymmetrical warfare. Determining the threat courses of action is the final step of IPB. According to FM COIN, there are basically three types of violent activities that insurgents can choose to utilize: terrorist, guerilla, or conventional tactics. Terrorist tactics employ violence primarily against non-combatants, innocent bystanders. Terror attacks do not require a large number of persons; they are less than the number that makes up guerrilla or conventional warfare.

Terrorist attacks usually have political motivations and with their main objective to alter government policies or gather popular support. Guerilla tactics feature hit and run attacks by a lightly armed group which focus on harassing counter-insurgents. They seek the public’s attention as the make it known that they are the ones responsible for particular attacks. These attacks aren’t meant to be military victories or decisive battles, but they can be simultaneously used with supporting terror tactics. Lastly, conventional warfare tactics are hardly used by insurgents because they lack the political support to form sophisticated military formations. non-military courses of action such as kidnapping, political demonstrations, hostage taking, infiltration and subversion, propaganda and seizure actions.

After the IPB phase, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) operations phasing is purposed, “to develop the intelligence needed to address the issues of driving the insurgency. In the ISR phase of the intelligence cycle in COIN, there are five core focuses which include: a focus on the local populace, intelligence collection activity, the localized nature of insurgencies, on the ground military forces as potential collectors, and understanding the insurgent use of complex terrain. Because of the nature of the conflict, military intelligence and operational activity are unique forces from within COIN activity. According to FM COIN, “Intelligence and operations have a dynamic relationship… Intelligence drives operations and successful operations generate additional intelligence,” It is through this correlation of each driving the other and vice versa that COIN operations continue to be successful.

Every boot on the ground is a potential collector and facilitator of battlefield intelligence. Though the other types of intelligence collection are important (especially geospatial intelligence due to complex terrain), the HUMINT aspect is the most vital because it is the most useful in helping soldiers understand the mind-set of the enemy, their operational capabilities, and their relationship with the populace. An intelligence officer can gather intelligence from a variety of channels such as patrol debriefings, after action reports, civil affairs reports, psyops reports, special operation forces reporting, leadership liaisons and tip hotlines. Another interesting but controversial part HUMINT usage in COIN is the interrogation of detainees and debriefing of defectors. There is a wealth of information that can be gained from these individuals as they can provide details about the internal operations of an insurgency. Interrogation generates some amount of controversy because of the types of techniques that may be used that are considered abusive of the detainee. The next subtopic of this book relates to the topic of counterintelligence and counter reconnaissance in COIN. Counterintelligence is a focused directive implemented to neutralize the insurgent’s intelligence collection efforts. This is accomplished through counterintelligence investigations, analysis and production, and functional and technical services. Counterintelligence includes all actions taken to detect, identify, exploit and nullify the extensive intelligence activities of competitors, opponents and adversaries. It is extremely important to use counterintelligence capabilities in COIN missions. Insurgents place a very high emphasis on utilizing informants, double agents, surveillance and other methods that would provide them with valuable intelligence. It therefore makes sense to be highly cautious when conducting counterintelligence operations as potential sources may be working for both sides of conflict with very minimal, if any, loyalty to either side. It is therefore up to expert counter intelligence officers to identify individuals who may be compromising operational security. Insurgents also have counter-surveillance capabilities such as hiding among the local population, using off-the shelf counter SIGNIT/ELINT solutions to counter our high technological edge, or even use couriers to transfer money, intelligence, and orders to facilitate their operations. Intelligence operations are greatly enhanced when the collection and analysis actions of various units are cohesive and well managed.

By ensuring that all efforts, from the lower to the upper echelon units, continuously work in tandem, this would aid in reducing any gaps in the intelligence process. Synchronization of the intelligence efforts involve various intelligence agencies from the host and allied nations. Operations are guaranteed greater success with the coordination of these resources. This unity would also help to maintain a high degree of situational awareness and a more efficient and effective use of resources. Through Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations, intelligence officers are actively collecting all-source intelligence from the battlefield, which helps both the field and intelligence components of a COIN operation. Through counterintelligence and counter reconnaissance efforts in COIN, the activities of insurgent and terrorist organizations are neutralized.

Observation and investigation can only occur if we have successfully detected the element in question. Further investigation and adjudication is linked by discovery. To dismantle insurgent networks and eliminate insurgents both detection and discovery are required. We infer about suspected individuals when we observe discrepancies/suspicious movements about them as they roam around , mixing with the locals possibly with the intent to study ,say the security forces location or assess their capabilities/movement patterns.

This is observation. When several suspicious incidents occur there becomes room for investigation. And as we investigate we discover say individuals with high certainty of insurgent affiliations or certain movements directly/indirectly related to insurgent logistics. To sum up, with detection , investigation , observation and discovery our intent is to discern the dynamics of the insurgency movement. This detection, the main link.. requires intelligence. We need to go out there , with a plan in mind, utilize our collectors, get as much information as possible, collate it , analyse  it, at the same time  conducting surveillance and investigating observable phenomena which in turn will drive more collection and analysis with the final outcome of a discovery or a series of discovery about the insurgents.

Without the intelligence cycle we can never hope to zero in on the insurgents successfully—it will be just the usual scatter gun approach—not concrete actionable intelligence but inferences based on personal judgment and past experience—‘’the intelligence trap’’ which we should always avoid. When the insurgent comes in the open to do surveillance detection comes into play , discovery comes when the insurgents get down to planning a plot and execution of the plot is negated by detection, observation and discovery. But observation and discovery cannot follow suit if we have not detected the insurgents or their movements etc well. It is a well known fact that insurgent groups disperse to new areas offering them sanctuary when things become too hot due to security forces offensive operations. Now these new sanctuaries have no past history of insurgent activity. In other words in these areas insurgency is at its nascent state. Intelligence becomes all the more important in this particular case. Every terrorist operation has three phases: research (thwarted by detection); planning (thwarted by discovery); and execution (thwarted by observation, detection and discovery).

The only true way of knowing when a terrorist operation is being planned is to uncover their research, which includes all the things that they know, who they know, what they're reading, and so forth. In many cases, this can be accomplished by traditional criminal justice footwork. In other cases, it requires some extraordinary surveillance efforts. Relatively low priorities are assigned to covering the early phases of insurgencies. Lack of activity in an area does not mean we should not be concerned. The problem is ISR assets are already not sufficient and whatever we have they are allocated to high-insurgency zones rather than in those places where there is little(but not nil) history of insurgent activity. ISR assets should not only be dedicated to tactical ops and force protection but also to emergent threats. In an insurgent network there is ‘’ideology’’ at the top of the hierarchy. Ideology gives birth to ‘’strategic objectives’’ and each of these strategies , after more refinement and evaluation leads to a ‘’plan’’ wherein resources are dedicated , that is put to use in the most optimum fashion to achieve the desired results.

There is a plane between strategy and tactics. Tactics is the collective name for ‘’methods’’ of engaging , employing or maneuvering resources in a conflict, in a battle. This plane is known as ‘’doctrine’’. The doctrine , in addition to other variables drives the plan. The doctrine lays out how operations were conducted by this group in the past, not only ops but all facets connected with the movement, how other similar groups from our country or other countries performed and a critical study of their success and failures and how ‘’legitimate’’ are the actions of the insurgents in the eyes of the media and public.

At this point ‘’legitimacy’’. .that is the governments views about the movement does not take precedence over that of media/public. It surely will factor in the long run but for immediate purposes a tactical win, say a successful attack on the security forces given wide publicity by the media and jeopardizing the prestige of the government before the public due to its failure.. this is more important. In addition to providing a focus for planning it also lays out the tactics. A tactic is a specific/specialized element of a mission but we can have an array of tactics to achieve a general objective , like repeated tactical operations in order to overwhelm the media with news of insurgent activity. When tactics are added up the plan leads to the formation of a ‘’plot’’.

Tactics form the repository of the group which contains rehearsed/practiced actions making up the modus operandi. One or more members of the group are specialized in the usage of a specific tactic. These specific skills can cover expertise in weapons and explosives, map reading, deception, intelligence and counterintelligence, psychological operations, sabotage, surveillance and counter surveillance, photography and forgery in document preparation, medicine and first aid, propaganda, target selection and assessment, hand to hand combat, couriers to name a few. The crux of the matter is we must dedicate all our efforts to detect this ‘’plot’’, preempt  the insurgents and hence deny them their desired objectives and destroy our target which can be the insurgents themselves or any other variable associated with their intended plot. We must also, and this is more important in counter insurgency, leave room to exploit the enemy to our advantage using counterintelligence techniques. From the above it is clear that to detect, deny, exploit and destroy we need intelligence and counterintelligence and without these two, however much we pitch in our military might we can never succeed to eradicate the movement.

Insurgents place heavy reliance on gathering intelligence. They use all means necessary, i.e. informants, double agents, surveillance, to further their collection of vital intelligence.

OPSEC is thus very important; government personnel must carefully screen everyone working with them. Failure to do so can result in infiltration of protected facilities and even deaths of government personnel.

Insurgents diligently weave the irown reconnaissance and surveillance networks so as to do their harm without detection. Their networks include the citizens who act as their early warning system and inform them of counterinsurgent movements.

Sophisticated counter ISR efforts assist in identifying the techniques and weaknesses of enemy reconnaissance. Commanders would gain great advantage as they would be able to detect signs of insurgent preparations and surprise and neutralize them.

Insurgents may also have a SIGINT capability based on commercially available scanners and radios, wiretaps, or stolen counterinsurgent equipment. Information that is transmitted through these type of equipment are vulnerable and can be “tapped” or diverted. Because of these deficiencies it would be ideal if counterinsurgents did not use commercial radios or phones.

But when joint forces are conducting CMO, commercial equipment may be their primary means of communication. To not have them would severely limit and degrade the CMO effort. In such instances counterinsurgents must be careful to exercise OPSEC protocols when using such equipment.

The multidisciplinary (HUMINT, IMINT, GEOINT, SIGINT, FISINT, MASINT,OSINT) fusion of information by intelligence organizations results in the production of all-source intelligence products.

Analysis for COIN operations is very challenging as it involves multiple components to study and understand. Perceptions and cultures take time to absorb, understand and utilize. The need to track hundreds or thousands of personalities is made even more difficult as they change over time.

As in any joint operation, intelligence and operations have a cyclical relationship. This dynamic relationship is particularly important in COIN—intelligence drives operations and successful operations generate additional intelligence. The reverse is also true. COIN efforts conducted without accurate intelligence may alienate the population, which results in their offering less information.

Because intelligence and operations are so closely related, it is important for collectors to be linked directly to the analysts and operators they support. Similarly, analysts must remain responsive to their supported units’ intelligence requirements. Collectors should not passively wait for operators to submit requirements; rather, they should closely monitor the OE and recommend requirements based on their understanding of operators’ needs.

In general, collection focuses on the populace, insurgents, and HN. Several factors are particularly important for ISR operations in COIN environments, including: a focus on the local population, collection occurring at all echelons, localized nature of insurgencies, all counterinsurgents prepared to function as potential collectors, and insurgent use of complex terrain. Given the potential challenges faced by intelligence assets in collecting information against insurgent networks, counterinsurgents must effectively employ all available intelligence collection capabilities.

Due to the various methods that may or may not be known about the opponent, asymmetric warfare requires actionable intelligence available to the warfighter in a timely manner for operational execution of a mission.

Intelligence effectiveness for Army operations is measured by its timeliness, relevance, accuracy, and predictability. Effective intelligence in asymmetric warfare allows for commanders and Soldiers to target and narrow the scope of actionable intelligence (in contrast to other adversarial requirements). There are variety of techniques used to collect actionable intelligence which are best suited at particular scenarios and time frames. Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is one of the intelligence gathering methods that is most diverse, flexible, and cost effective which also makes it the most universal method.

Another   element   of   Hybrid   Warfare   is   the   prominence   of   asymmetric   conflict.   Technology and the empowerment afforded to some groups inspired by a global ideology by the superpowers during the cold war has meant that it has transformed from a peripheral and supporting activity to a prominent, and sometimes primary, means of conflict.  Central  to  the  current  situation  is  the  practice  of  arming  non-state  actors  as  Proxies.  This has been the overt and largely covert practice of most states, but has been a particularly active part of the culture of Western foreign policy.  It is perhaps not pertinent to discuss the ethics of this issue within this paper. 

Purely on the basis of real politic and national interest, the practice of proxy warfare with non-state actors is past is outdated. It is as acceptable and as pragmatic an element of foreign policy today as would be the practice of imperialism.  The  reason  is  simple.    Non-state  actor-based  asymmetric  warfare  has  become  too  successful.   Information   technology   provides   even   the   poorest   people   with   weapons,   influence  and  know-how.    If  these  are  supported  by  weapons  and  money  from  states,  they  become  potent  forces.   

Most  significant,  however,  are  not  their  weapons  or  training  but  a  dramatic  shift  in  their  worldview  that  they  can  defeat  superpowers.    This  belief  originated  amongst  the  mujahedeen  in  Afghanistan  and  has  been  reinforced  by  the  myth  that  insurgents defeated the USA in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

This  increase  in  capability  and  intent  has  led  to  an  increase  in  threat.  The  threat  emerges  because  the  impact  and  actions  of  proxies  can  no  longer  be  contained  within  the  geography  of  their  ‘area  of  operation.’  The  proxy  threat  frequently  overspills  borders  to become  a  regional  one.  When  mixed  with  revolutionary  ideologies  like  Islamist  extremism,  the  proxy  threat  becomes  global,  impacting  major  powers  in  the  form  of  domestic  terrorism  and refugees.

The cyber domain provides a pervasive and agile outlet for influence operations. These are  basically  an  advanced  form  of  political  propaganda;  an  activity  which  became  closely  aligned with warfare operations during WWII.  In the contemporary world, this has led to the belief  that  social  network  manipulation  could  result  in  mobilization  for  political  change.  Swarming  and  chaos  theories  are  just  some  of  the  new  ideas  that  have  taken  hold. 

Propaganda,  based  on  Liddle  Hart’s  concept  of  constructing  consensus,  has  given  way  to  ideas such as information dominance.  These  emerging  views  are  in  vogue  particularly  amongst  practitioners  who  largely  originate  from  the  media,  advertising  and  entertainment  industry.  However,  the  claims  lack  critical  examination.  What  works  in  Western  media  culture,  in  its  consumer  industry  and  its  entertainment  sector  does  not  necessarily  transfer  successfully  into  a  defensive  and  potentially  hostile  political  culture.   

The  media  is  an  increasingly  free  market  and  so  it  is  difficult  for  anyone  to  dominate,  except  possibly  for  brief  periods.    People  choose  which  messages they believe in the same way they choose which music to download – based on their  political  or  social  culture.  Cynicism  over  the  motives  of  major  powers  is  a  prevalent  component   of   political   culture   in   the   developing   world.   Consequently,   communication   operations  aimed  at  influence  have  limited  effect  except  when  they  are  used  to  reinforce  a  recognizable political or military reality.

That is not to say that information operations are without utility merely that they are less precise and effective than many in the burgeoning information and strategic communication community sometimes claim. Certainly, there is a paucity of reliable uncontested data on the strategic effectiveness of such operations. The  targeting  of  civilians,  the  empowerment  of  non-state  actors  and  the  armament  of  cyberspace are all factors that have been used by major powers including those in the West.

These have yielded short term success in the past but their increasingly negative longer-term impact  is  now  confronting  the  West  in  terms  of  a  new  threat  environment.  Ethical  policy  arguments  aside,  these  issues  are  a  menace  which  the  West  can  at  best  only  contain  by  military force. These issues are primarily political in nature and so their eradication will have to be mainly by political and other means.

One  hurdle  in  civilian  mechanisms  of  power  being  able  to  deliver  what  is  required  is  that government organizations are culturally reactive rather than proactive. They neither have the  concepts  or  capabilities  to  deal  with  many  contingencies  at  home  let  alone  a  defense  contingency  abroad. 

Foreign  ministries  and  foreign  elements  of  intelligence  services  are  exceptions  to  this,  but  even  they  tend  to  have  a  limited  capability  for  contingency  planning  and crisis management in hostile or dangerous situations.  Although the concept of soft power has been around for a while and senior politicians understand the concept of unity of command, there is a cultural inability to think in terms of conflict, to act with confidence in a conflict environment and to take the lead in what we call non-kinetic  aspects. 

Historically,  the  Army,  Navy  and  Air  Forces  used  to  have  separate  ministries  in  government  but  they  have  learned  the  crucial  importance  of  joint  operations.  They  are  not  just  joint  at  ministerial  level,  but  also  at  the  command  operational  level.    The  civilian  ministries  potentially  involved  in  a  full  spectrum  approach  remain  distinct.    As  the  relationship  between  the  DOD  and  State  Department  during  the  early  stages  of  the  Iraq  campaign demonstrated, they sometimes find it hard to work constructively together.  The Russians have attempted to address this problem with a unified command center in  Moscow  and  reports  indicate  that  this  system  works  well.    The  existence  of  a  central  decision  making  authority  allows  a  more  agile  approach  to  a  rapidly  evolving  situation.   

It  further allows for continually changing initiatives to force an adversary into a reactive position by getting inside the adversary’s ODA (observe, decide and act) loop.  Daesh and other terrorist organizations are essentially unitary structures, albeit often in cellular  form,  simultaneously  focusing  on  all  aspects  of  their  existence. 

This  structure  encourages a culture of initiative and agility, which accounts for some of their success.  Militaries  taking  the  lead  on  hybrid  warfare  capability  development  in  their  countries  should carefully assess the wisdom of taking on responsibility for additional soft power tasks. Instead  they  would  be  better  focusing  on  increasing  their  capability  to  conduct  a  broader  range  and  greater  number  of  hard  power  operations.  They  could,  however,  help  the  civil  power to understand its greater responsibility for involvement in 'hybrid warfare.' This would require a deliberate effort to change the military’s current ‘can do’ culture to a ’you must also do' stance towards the elements of civil power responsible for delivering hybrid warfare.

The  term  ‘hybrid  warfare’  is  itself  culturally  objectified.    It  suggests  that  conflict  exists  and that the hybrid or full spectrum approach provides a means of winning it. The term and associated doctrinal culture has relatively few, if any, concepts aimed at preventing, deterring and defusing conflict, except the very existence of a hybrid capability.  Indeed, the influence and  economic  components  of  hybrid  warfare  require  a  state  of  almost  continual  dominance  to be effective, thereby creating a perception of perpetual competition spilling over into virtual conflict. 

In  its  attempt  to  deal  with  a  new  form  of  warfare,  the  hybrid  warfare  approach  is  actually introducing a new form of cold conflict.  An  assessment  of  current  Russian  threat  analysis  indicates  that  it  views  the  West  as  the  creators  and  practitioners  of  hybrid  warfare.  Russian  defense  staff  and  analysts  believe  that  hybrid  warfare  is  a  method  developed  to  threaten  and  degrade  Russian  political  power  over time. They view many of the current conflicts as “proxy conflicts” waged by the West “in their   near   vicinity   in   order   to   destabilize   their   periphery.”  

Consequently,   Russia   has   established  a  unified  command  structure  to  defend  against  and  establish  a  lead  in  hybrid  warfare. The result is a virtual arms race in hybrid capability.  Much Islamist extremist insurgency propaganda has long pointed to the West’s use of cultural dominance as a component of its political and military dominance.

They point to the ineffective,  corrupt  and  repressive  pro-Western  Muslim  regimes  as  evidence  of  its  success.  Their  effective  propaganda  highlights  the  social  chaos,  economic  strife  and  thousands  of  civilian  deaths  through  to  redefine  the  West’s  motives  for  intervention  in  Muslim  countries. 

One of the most powerful components is their quotation of a highly relevant Qur’anic verse:  “And when it is said to them: ’Make not mischief on the earth,’ they say: ‘We are only peace  makers.  Verily!  They  are  the  ones  who  make  mischief,  but  they  perceive  it  not.” 

From  the  West’s  point  of  view  these  are  wars  of  liberation  as  expressed  in  the  title  of  Gene  Sharp’s  book,  “From  Dictatorship  to  Democracy: A  Conceptual  Framework  for  Liberation.”  Culturally we think that we are a force for good but our adversaries see these actions as  genuinely  threatening.  Hence  there  is  a  confusion  of  motives  and  threats  between  adversaries.  Such  confusion  can  lead  to  conflict,  as  it  did  100  years  ago. 
Some  of  the  reasons  why  the  world  plunged  into  the  horrific  First  World  War  were  because  “diplomacy  was   side-lined,   moves   were   misinterpreted   and   motives   were   misconstrued.”1   While   attempting to absorb diplomacy and foreign policy, hybrid warfare currently has few concepts which ensure moves and motives are not misunderstood by potential adversaries.

Many of these issues occurred as a lack of military and political cultural awareness and self-  awareness.  Sun  Tzu  declared  that  the  ultimate  goal  is  to  subdue  the  enemy  without  fighting.  A  prerequisite  is  to  understand  the  enemy.  Whether  wining  is  by  fighting  or  not,  victory is most likely achieved through understanding ourselves and knowing our enemy.  While  there  are  many  challenges  involved  in  gaining  an  objective  understanding  of  ourselves  the  problems  of  analysis  and  understanding  is  a  prominent  one.  States  usually  decide  on  a  course  of  action  based  on  their  national  interest. 

As  national  interest  is  usually  competitive, it is by nature selfish. Consequently, politicians tend to articulate their policies in judicial or ethical rhetoric. For example, by claiming that they are acting in self-defense or the defense  of  the  weak  or  oppressed.  That  rhetoric  justifies  strategic  choice  rather  than  interests. Take  the  example  of  Russia  in  Syria.  Its  national  interest  was  preserving  its  bases  in  Syria.  The  political  rhetoric  used  to  justify  its  actions  against  rebel  forces  was  to  fight  terrorists  who  threatened  sovereignty  and  security  of  states.  Their  strategic  choice  was  to  support the regime forces primarily through air power. 
This  trinity  of  national  interest,  political  rhetoric  and  strategic  choice  or  political  policy  are  the  critical  components  of  political  and  military  analysis.  Very  few  people  are  aware  let  alone  competent  in  these  skills.  Dialogue  on  the  basis  of  interest  rather  than  on  strategic  choice or position is one of the fundamental principles of successful diplomatic negotiations.  Wars,  however,  are  often  started  because  the  strategic  choice  of  an  adversary  is  unacceptable  whereas  their  national  interest  could  well  have  been  accommodated  through  negotiations.