IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE

If ‘seeing is believing’ and ‘a picture can speak a thousand words’, then the importance of imagery intelligence as a collection discipline needs little explanation.

Advances in technology have meant that imagery intelligence offers the analyst the ability to see, record and evaluate scenes that would otherwise be out of reach.

Imagery intelligence provides decision makers with a physical representation of the information, making it a more graphic and compelling form of intelligence since an image is much more easily understood by policymakers than other forms of intelligence.

Imagery intelligence is often described simply as information that can be seen: maps, drawings, photographs and other representations of the world in image form. However, while imagery intelligence is intelligence seen, not all things seen are intelligence.

Imagery intelligence has four elements that define its practice and distinguish it from both the other intelligence collection disciplines as well as from other forms of imagery collection that is not intelligence.

These factors include the visual element; the intentional observation of a target; the use of a security lens; and finally that it is technologically captured in some way.

The first important aspect of imagery intelligence is that it is visual. Imagery intelligence is about which what is seen. That is, the means through which the information is collected involves capturing and representing a visual image through some technological means.

For example, video recordings and photographs are two of the most common examples of what imagery intelligence produces and demonstrates how visual information is presented. This visual quality is clearly imagery intelligence’s most distinguishable feature and separates it from the other collection disciplines, like human and signals intelligence.
However, while this separates it from the other collection disciplines, it tells us little about how imagery intelligence is separate from the other images not necessarily understood as intelligence. It is the other elements that mark imagery intelligence as distinct from ordinary imagery collection.

The second element of imagery intelligence is that there is a difference between seeing and observing. People ‘see’ things all the time. The majority of the time they are actually unable to stop ‘seeing’ things.

The mind is barraged with an endless stream of visual events, most of which it chooses to ignore. Seeing is often a mindless, constant, passive and unintentional. By contrast, ‘observing’ has a purpose, it is an intentional act on behalf of the viewer. There is an active hunt, a desire to find, and the aim to look for something. This aspect of imagery intelligence is important as it highlights the fact that it is an activity that is purposefully carried out, something an individual intended on doing after deliberation. Indeed, for imagery intelligence the intention is to collect information through the observation of a specific target.

The third aspect of imagery intelligence and intelligence more broadly, is that it views the world through a ‘security lens’. This security lens is shaped by the threats and risks a community faces and determines what information is intelligence and what is just data.

By looking at the world through this security lens, raw information is evaluated in regards to the end goal of protecting the political community. Again this is an important point to make for two reasons. First is that by highlighting this security lens it makes clear how almost any information can be turned into intelligence depending on the circumstances. A report on a weather front, for example, can become intelligence if it is related to a specific operation.
By passing the information through the security lens the information can then be transformed into intelligence as the ‘who’, ‘where’ and ‘what’ of a scenario are all perceived differently. Second, since this security lens is shaped by the intention to protect the political community it can have important consequences for the ethical evaluation of imagery intelligence. That is, the end goal for an activity can alter the ethical evaluation of that activity.

Acting to protect the political community is judged in a different way to an activity carried out by or for a private commercial goal, for example. This also stresses the point that this project is only concerned with actions carried out by or on behalf of the state, and that private companies that carry out intelligence for their own needs are not being considered.

The final aspect of imagery intelligence is how the information is ‘captured’. Imagery intelligence essentially takes something that can be seen, ‘captures’ it and presents it in some visual way. This aspect is important because before an item is captured it only exists in the mind of the beholder, an image that comes and goes in an instant.

Imagery intelligence takes various ‘scenes’ in their transient state and turns them into a physical entity that can then be stored, retrieved, analyzed and presented.

Imagery intelligence represents this information through a medium that can be seen. For example, photographs, pictures, drawings or maps are all physical representations or reflections of what exists in the real world. This is important because it separates imagery intelligence from forms of intelligence that are seen but are transient or subject to interpretation.

However, the term ‘imagery intelligence’ houses a variety of highly diverse collection activities. These activities will generally fall into two groups, that is, the use of imagery intelligence to monitor large, state-level events and the use of imagery intelligence on the domestic level, collecting information on individuals and their activities.

Imagery intelligence at the international level tends to focus on military activities or activities that can only be witnessed by looking at a wide-angle viewpoint. For example, troop movements, military and industrial installations, weapon test sights, mapping of terrain, regional disturbances, inter-state relationships and other inter-actor events. In comparison, imagery intelligence in the domestic sphere focuses on activities at the societal or individual level.

Throughout its brief history, imagery intelligence at the state level has been heavily dominated by the United States and, during the Cold War, the Soviet Union. As a result of the constant rivalry between these then superpowers, the Cold War saw a rapid development of imagery intelligence. However, despite this Cold War focus, imagery intelligence had indeed been used for some time before.

It was during the First World War that visual and photographic reconnaissance saw its strategic début. At the beginning of the First World War the British Royal Flying Corps conducted aerial surveillance of the German troops advancing through Belgium and aerial surveillance was quickly recognized as an impressive substitute to cavalry patrols offering the ability to survey battle lines from Switzerland to the North Sea.

Brigadier General William Mitchell wrote, “one flight over the lines gave me a much clearer impression of how armies were laid out than any amount of travelling on the ground”.

World War Two saw the importance of military surveillance advance further as the United States remodeled B-17 and B-24 aircraft with cameras in order to give a bird’s eye view of the battle below. This meant that by the beginning of the Cold War the potential importance of imagery intelligence had been clearly established. However, it was during the prolonged Cold War that its true importance was demonstrated, not least of all because it was seen by the West as an essential tool for piercing the Iron Curtain.

It is, therefore, during the Cold War years that imagery intelligence sees some of its most important developments: the construction, launch and advancement of spy-planes and satellite based imagery collection.

The first spy-plane to be developed, the U-2, was designed with the hope of obtaining reliable data on the ‘bomber gap’ between the superpowers. These planes would take pictures of the ground in order to provide a visual account of location and development of various systems.

A series of 30 U-2 flights were performed over Soviet controlled space providing imagery intelligence “impressive enough to persuade America’s leaders that the Soviets had far fewer bombers than initially feared”.

Currently, the U-2R is the version used which has a range of more than 3,000 miles, a maximum speed of 528 knots at an altitude of 40,000 feet and can be equipped with a variety of sensors including electro-optical and an all-weather, day or night Aperture Radar System.

They can detect both the visible and non-visible parts of the electromagnetic spectrum, transmitting back in real-time and have the added bonus over satellites of being more easily ‘directed’ to a specific location when urgency is required.

The second major military imagery intelligence advancement during the Cold War was the development and launch of the first imagery based satellite by the Americans, CORONA. This satellite used photographic film to take pictures of the land far below, giving details of industrial buildings, medium-range, intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missile launching bases, as well as Soviet construction sites for submarine and surface fleets.

Over the years CORONA was replaced by an increasing number of upgrades that gave American military intelligence the ability to see more than ever before. For example, the KH-11 first developed in 1976 represented a quantum leap in imagery technology, providing for the first time the ability to return images in real-time rather than film having to be ejected in canisters and collected. Other advances included an increase in resolution as well as the development of electro-optical cameras that were able to ‘see’ through cloud cover and even at night.

The current ONYX satellite is a system that, rather than employing an electro-optical system, carries a radar imaging systems that offers the ability to monitor foreign weapon storage sites, troop movements and even the tracking of underwater submarines in almost any weather conditions.

Finally, satellites equipped with multi-spectral or hyper-spectral imagery (MSI and HSI) derive an ‘image’ from analyzing the individual electromagnetic ‘reflections’ given off by an object when scanned, often referred to ‘measurement and signals intelligence’ or MASINT. MASINT can therefore be vital in determining the presence of chemical or biological warfare agents or clandestine nuclear test sites.

As such, spy-planes and satellites illustrate some of the most vital advances in military imagery intelligence, providing the ability to see from a vantage point far beyond the normal capacity of any individual. The building and development of weapons and industry, troop movements and even just the lay of the land can all be monitored over a varied amount of time. Satellites and spy-planes, therefore, represent some of the most important tools in a state’s effort to know and prepare for military attacks in an uncertain world.

Society-based imagery intelligence is generally aimed at monitoring individuals in the hope of stopping or preventing damage at the societal level. Threats to a society are just as likely to come from within its own borders as they are from an outside military incursion. Therefore domestic imagery intelligence can include, “the prevention or detection of serious crime”; maintaining the general peace of society; as well as protecting the state from “espionage, terrorism and sabotage”.

Unlike military and international imagery intelligence, which is dominated by the global superpowers, domestic or society imagery intelligence is used by many more states, varying in coverage according to costs.

Intelligence organisations that specialise in domestic intelligence collection include, for example, the Security Service in the United Kingdom (commonly referred to as MI5), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the United States, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS), France’s Direction Centrale du Renseignement Intérieur (DCRI) and the Federal Security Service (FSB) of the Russian Federation, to name but a few. These agencies rely on the use of closed circuit television systems, ‘intensive surveillance’ and ‘intrusive surveillance’ in order to provide the required imagery intelligence.

Closed circuit televisions, or CCTVs, have become a common landscape feature for a lot of states. Indeed, many have argued that we are living in a ‘CCTV culture’, where it is “virtually impossible to move through public spaces without being photographed and recorded”.

These electronic eyes watch, follow and record the daily activities of individuals within a society in order to provide information on problem areas, locate and highlight suspicious elements or follow a specific target.

Furthermore, technological advances mean that cameras are able to recognize faces and behavior in individuals so as to detect problems quickly and allow swift action before they are able to disrupt the peace. ‘Intensive surveillance’, in comparison, involves the covert monitoring and recording of a target’s movements by an intelligence officer with a camera.

For example, this can involve a stalking’ method, whereby an individual is followed and photographed as he performs certain activities.

Finally, ‘intrusive surveillance’ involves planting an electronic device that covertly records the target while he is in his private property.

These three collection means – CCTV cameras, intensive surveillance and intrusive surveillance – are the backbone of the domestic imagery collection system and therefore represent the most relevant set of imagery intelligence activities for this chapter.

Imagery intelligence clearly plays an important role in maintaining the security of the political community. It provides analysts and policymakers with physical, relatively easy to understand and recordable forms of intelligence at both the international and domestic level. On the international level it means one state is able to view another state’s land, defenses and military activities, while on the domestic level it can collect intelligence about people and their individual actions.

Also, we can conclude that the population of the country with hard video surveillance became very docile, “lobotomized” and ready to execute any order from the government.

‘Intrusive surveillance’ involves placing electronic cameras, or ‘bugs’, that capture a target’s actions when he is within his own house or property in the hope of recording nefarious activity. Moreover, the placement of such devices will often involve ‘covert interference’ with that property.

Tactics could involve either breaking and entering the property to place the device, or intelligence agencies employing telephone companies to put a fault on a targets line, so when they report the fault an intelligence agent could respond and use the granted access to plant the bug.

Reported examples of such a device include the installing of a camera in the target’s television: “so that when the occupant sits to watch television, which we have rigged so that the television is watching him”. Equally, direct access to the house is not always needed. By renting a neighboring property, agents can drill a small hole through an adjoining wall and then feed a small fiber optic camera through the hole. One of the greatest benefits for planting the devices inside a target’s home is that nefarious activities are more likely to occur in areas where the actor feels he is protected and free from watching eyes.